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FOLLOW THE MONEY: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES AND THE IMPACT OF LOCAL LEVIES ON
ADOPTIONS IN OHIO
SUSAN VIVIAN MANGOLD AND CATHERINE CERULLI
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1961, the federal government has been an actor in the locally
delivered child welfare system, addressing the needs of abused and
neglected children by creating both mandated policies and fiscal support
for child welfare systems.' At the federal level, policies have been
enacted, reformed, and amended repeatedly to rectify new problems,
sometimes created by their prior reform.2  Before the Obama
Administration even took office, advocacy organizations were developing
policy agendas to urge the new administration to continue to reform the
child welfare system, 3 and scholars were recommending new models for
legal accountability in the welfare state.4 Concurrently, states and local
governments are facing severe budget shortages causing freezes and cuts in
Copyright© 2009, Susan Vivian Mangold and Catherine Cerulli
* Professor Mangold is a Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo Law School,
State University of New York. Thanks to the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy for
support in researching this article. Thanks also to my Fall 2008 Child Welfare class for
their research and debate on state funding for child welfare services. Professor Cerulli is
Director of the Laboratory of Interpersonal Violence and Victimization and Assistant
Professor, Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of
Rochester.
1 Title IV of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 407-08, 75 Stat. 75, 75-78
(1961).
2 See ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AFDC PROGRAM 4-8 (1998), available at http://aspe.hhs.
gov/lhsp/AFDC/baseline/lhistory.pdf.
3 See CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, CLASP FEDERAL POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2009 AND BEYOND: AN OVERVIEW (Oct. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0436.pdf.
4 Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in
the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, L. & Soc. INQUIRY
(forthcoming 2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1088020.
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a range of child welfare services.5  Undoubtedly, these budgetary
constraints will have an impact on children's wellbeing.
This article draws attention beyond the policies to the fiscal strategies
at the federal, state, and local levels that impact the service delivery,
sometimes perversely altering the policy initiatives. All who watch the
child welfare system are repeatedly flummoxed by the unintended
consequences that flow from each new policy initiative. Examining the
fiscal policies underlying the mandates can help explain these nagging
problems, while illuminating the gross inefficiencies in the system. In
particular, we consider the use of dedicated tax levies by approximately
half of the eighty-eight counties in Ohio. Using ten years of data provided
by the Public Children Services Association of Ohio (PCSAO), we
examine whether the use of levies correlates with an increasing or
decreasing number of children in care over time, as well as the number of
adoptions and the mean number of days children await adoption.
The child protection and child welfare systems balance the rights and
responsibilities of parents and the state when a child is reported as abused
or neglected.6 Once the state intervenes and assumes some or all of the
parental rights, the private arrangements and exchange of rights between
biological parents are no longer sufficient to understand the legal
arrangements in that family. This tripartite relationship between the
parent-child-state has been the central focus of constitutional
jurisprudence, scholarly writing, and bureaucratic decision-making. In
private family law or domestic relations, the rights of biological parents
govern the custody of the child.7 In public family law, state and federal
laws govern the limits and character of state intervention.8
When should the state intervene into families? When do children's
rights to state protection overcome the parental right to raise their children
as they see fit? When does a child's independent right to empowerment or
5 Erik Eckholm, States Slashing Social Programs for Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2009, at Al.
6 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2004);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-1(a) (West 2005).
7 See, e.g., OfIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (2005); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.401
(2009).
8 The phrase public family law is used to highlight the role of the state and federal
government in the lives of children identified by the child protective services system. See
Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent, Child, State Triangle in Public Family
Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REv.
1397, 1397(1999).
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autonomy emerge? How does the state best exercise the parens patriae
power to help abused and neglected children grow into healthy adults?
These are all questions that play out in the one-dimensional triangle of the
parent, child, and state. For a generation, federal mandates implemented at
a state level have addressed these questions. These mandates have brought
about a new set of questions concerning state autonomy and creativity in
addressing family matters that traditionally have been left to private
individuals or local officials.9 We consider this the substantive dimension
of child welfare law.
Since 1961, with the advent of federal funding for foster care, a second
triangle has emerged that is less noted by the courts and commentators, but
is often determinative in the bureaucratic realm of child welfare. 10 That is
the sharing of fiscal responsibility between the federal, state, and local
governments to pay for child welfare services." We consider this the
fiscal dimension of child welfare law.12  Here, questions regarding the
proper distribution of the fiscal responsibility emerge. The federal
mandates are imposed in exchange for federal dollars in the form of grants
or open-ended entitlements, but the fiscal incentives are sometimes
contrary to the substantive goals of the legislation. 13 Further, these funding
incentives may be lost as state and local governments grapple with
eligibility criteria and alternative sources of funding.
9 See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787
(1995) (advocating localism, a theory which supports continued state sovereignty over
familial relations due to the normative character of family law and its close ties to a
"communitarian model of state authority under the Federal constitution"); Jill Elaine
Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1297 (1998)
(discussing the history of the roles of all levels of government in family law).
10 See Laura Radel, How and Why the Current Funding Structure Fails to Meet the
Needs of the Child Welfare Field, ASPE ISSUE BRIEF (August 2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/
hsp/05/fc-financing-ib/ib.pdf (providing an overview of federal child welfare funding
programs).
1"Id.
12 See generally David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REv.
2546 (2005) (providing an overview of Fiscal Federalism and a discussion of federal-state
funding for programs for low-income people). Debates about federalism are increasingly
about public finance (i.e., which level of government should pay for what). See, e.g.,
Richard Briffault, Public Finance in the American Federal System: Basic Patterns and
Current Issues, 2 COLuM. J. EUR. L. 533 (1997); Kenneth J. Drexler, The Four Causes of
the State and Local Budget Crisis and Proposed Solutions, 26 URB. LAW. 563 (1994).
13 See Radel, supra note 10, at 2.
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States' interests in maximizing the federal dollars flowing into the state
may move them away from the model policies enshrined in the federal
mandates. Foster care and adoption assistance are open-ended entitlements
under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.14 An unlimited federal match
is available to states for eligible children.' 5 For foster care, approximately
half of children can be certified as eligible,' 6 so other funding sources with
very different substantive goals may be substituted to provide key child
welfare services. The law changed in 2008 to eliminate income eligibility
for adoption assistance. 17  The impact of this fiscal change will be
important to follow in future research to assess the interrelationship
between policy, fiscal incentives, and actual service delivery.
Taken together, the substantive and fiscal considerations create a three-
dimensional analysis with a dynamic relationship that not only impacts the
delivery of child welfare entitlement services, but also impacts other
human services programs. Although it may seem obvious that fiscal
considerations will guide service delivery, or that service needs will drive
fiscal appropriations, the dynamic is more complicated. The complication
arises because the substantive and fiscal dimensions are played out in fifty-
one different states (counting Washington, D.C. as a state for these
purposes). Many states supplement Title IV-E funding with Social
Security Block Grants, Medicaid, or Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) funds to pay for entitlement services such as foster care,
adoption assistance, and independent living because they can garner more
federal funds through these funding streams than would be available to
them through Title IV-E.' 8 When states make these fiscal choices, they are
trading off other necessary services such as mental health, juvenile justice,
and health care for child welfare services.
Increasingly, local governments provide funds for child welfare,
contributing to the state match or adding local contributions to the overall
pot of funding for child welfare services with discretionary funds. Ohio is
at the forefront of county funding reliance, with local funding accounting
for 49% of total child welfare funding. Half of the eighty-eight counties
14 id.
15 Id
16 See KERRY DEVOOGHT ET.AL., FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL SPENDING TO ADDRESS
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN SFY 2006, at 30 (2008), http://www.childtrends.org/Files/
/ChildTrends-2009 02 17 FR CWFinancePaper.pdf.
17 See id. at 24.
18 See Radel, supra note 10, at 15.
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use a dedicated tax levy to provide the local funds for child welfare
services.
This article addresses the multidimensional aspects of substantive and
fiscal laws on the federal, state, and local levels guiding child welfare
services in all fifty-one states. In mapping out the complexity of the
system to address child abuse and neglect throughout the country, it
provides necessary detail to dispel growing concerns that federal mandates
are stifling state creativity.' 9 Instead, this research shows that in some
states, local fiscal concerns are shifting focus away from federal mandates.
It also raises a cautionary call to advocates and policymakers who focus on
the substance of the mandates or the type of funding stream available at the
federal level. Eligibility determinations, funds that can be substituted with
higher reimbursement rates, and state and local funding fiscal policies that
limit state matching funds are also crucial components of how child
welfare services are actually delivered. In particular, we analyze how local
tax levies may impact adoptions.
Part I1 of this article traces the development of fiscal federalism in the
child welfare system from the first initiative to correct racially induced
actions in some southern states in 1961 to the John Chaffee Program,
which targeted older children in foster care and passed in 2008. In
describing the Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act of 1974
(CAPTA),2° the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA),2 1 the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,22 the Foster
Care Independence Act of 1999,23 and their subsequent amendments, the
federal mandates and fiscal initiatives for each mandate are described.
Contradictions between the substantive goals and the funding incentives in
the legislation are highlighted.
Part III explores state and local funding strategies to take advantage of
the federal money made available in the laws detailed in Part II. Federal
entitlements to foster care and adoption assistance have designated state
19 See Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled
Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System? 41 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 281, 285-87 (2007).
20 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c
(1994 & Supp. 1997)).
21 Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 608,
620-28, 670-76 (1997)).
22 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §670-679c
(1994 & Supp. 1998)).
23 Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822.
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matching rates;24 other federal initiatives, such as preventive care and
independent living services, are available as capped federal grants.25 Other
services come to states via block grant funding.26 To maximize federal
dollars, the states use fifty-one different combinations of federal funding
programs, in addition to state and local strategies to provide child welfare
services to abused and neglected children.27 These are mapped generally in
Part III. We do not draw attention to the fiscal strategies at the state and
local levels to show the federal government how to save some of the
meager funds appropriated for child welfare. Rather, we highlight the
funding strategies to show their divorce from the federal policies they were
intended to facilitate.
Part IV focuses on the funding strategies in Ohio's eighty-eight
counties and their impact on adoptions. Using ten years of data provided
by PCSAO, we divide the counties into those with a dedicated property tax
levy for child welfare services and those without one. We examine
whether having a dedicated levy positively correlates with the number of
children in state care over time, the numbers of adoptions finalized, and the
mean number of days spent awaiting adoption. We found that having a
dedicated levy positively correlates with adoption outcomes by increasing
the number of adoptions and decreasing the mean days spent awaiting
adoption. The counties with levies also have a greater decrease in the
number of children in state care. In subsequent research, we hope to go
beyond these correlations to determine the relationship between funding
strategies and positive outcomes for children. Especially in difficult
economic times, with the counter-cyclical nature of child welfare services,
determining the funding model with the best outcomes for children has
important policy implications for the child welfare system.
24 See discussion infra Part III.A and notes 104-05.
25 See Donald L. Schmid, Funding Resources for Child Welfare (2000),
http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/financingfunding.htm.
26 See id.
27 See discussion infra Part III.C.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES AND FUNDING FOR STATE
AND LOCAL CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
28
A broad summary of the history of federal child welfare legislation is
necessary to understand the interrelationship between federal funding and
federal policies implemented on the state and local levels. A more
comprehensive discussion of the history of child welfare policy could
begin in colonial times, but we focus on those aspects of the history
relevant to the contemporary substantive and fiscal dimensions of the child
welfare system. The first federal foray into child welfare policy was under
President Theodore Roosevelt. In 1908, President Roosevelt convened the
White House Conference on Dependent Children. 29 This conference did
not immediately lead to federal child welfare initiatives, but instead
provided the impetus for states to provide women, paradigmatically
widows, with Mother's Pensions, a small stipend to assist them in
supporting their children.3° States picked up on this idea, but not in a
uniform or consistent manner.3' Different states used different eligibility
requirements and payment rates, but by 1935, all but two states offered
some form of Mother's Pensions.32
The federal government became more directly involved in caring for
children in single parent homes during the New Deal. In 1935, Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) was instituted along the same lines as the
Mother's Pensions and was operated by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW).3 3 States were allowed flexibility in
determining eligibility and rates, but the federal government supplied some
of the funding to help the states provide this needed assistance.
34
28 This section draws from Professor Mangold's earlier writings. See Susan Vivian
Mangold, Poor Enough to Be Eligible? Child Abuse, Neglect and the Poverty Requirement,
81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 575, 583-89 (2007); Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-
Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the
Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1412-29 (1999).
29 Jo Anne B. Ross, Fifty Years of Service to Children and Their Families, 48 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 5, 6 (1985); MATTHEW A. CRENSON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE:
A PREHISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 11 (1998).
30 See Ross, supra note 29 ("It's most far-reaching recommendation was to strengthen
family life by providing financial assistance to the mothers of needy children."); CRENSON,
supra note 29, at 261-62.
31 See, e.g., CRENSON, supra note 29, at 280-82.
32 See Ross, supra note 29.
33 Social Security Act of 1935, H.R. 7260, 74th Cong. § 401 (1935).
34 See id.
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The flexibility given to states to determine initial and ongoing
eligibility led to some discriminatory practices. By 1960, twenty-four
states included "suitable homes" requirements in their eligibility
guidelines.35 Eight of those states allowed the denial of aid to children
who were in homes that were deemed not "suitable," with no requirement
for remediation of the problematic conditions.36 A local caseworker could
determine that the home was not suitable for the proper upbringing of a
child and deny or cancel benefits without arranging to either improve the
conditions to a suitable level or make other plans for the child to be in an
environment deemed appropriate.37 In their official publications, HEW
criticized these practices but did not take immediate steps to correct
them.38
Before the National Biennial Round Table Conference of the American
Public Welfare Association, HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming stated:
[T]here is the issue of illegitimacy as it relates to the aid
for dependent children program. Personally, I am
completely out of sympathy with efforts to deal with this
problem by denying aid to the illegitimate child. I could
never reconcile myself to a program that puts itself in a
position of turning its back on the needs of a child because
of the sins of the parents. Not only am I convinced this
would be wrong, but I am also convinced that it would
make no contribution to the basic problem. 39
This criticism was not matched with directives or incentives to end or
correct the practices.
Later in 1960, Louisiana began the process to disqualify approximately
23,000 children from ADC because their homes did not meet the state's
35 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE ANNUAL REPORT 62 (1961).36 See id.
37 See id.
38 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Social Security Act, 23 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 35 (August
1960).
39 Arthur S. Fleming, Address by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 18
PUB. WELFARE 3, 4-5 (1960).
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suitability requirement.40  As described in 1961 by then HEW Secretary
Abraham Ribicoff:
In this instance, State legislation denied assistance to
children if the adult caretaker was living with, but not
legally married to, a mate; or if the mother had an
illegitimate child at any time since first receiving
assistance, unless she could prove to a parish welfare
board that she had ceased illicit relationships and was
maintaining a suitable home for her children.4'
The disqualification action by Louisiana struck a chord that resonated
through advocacy organizations and the federal government. In the fall of
1960, the waning months of the Eisenhower administration, Secretary
Flemming held hearings on the Louisiana ADC plan and practices. The
hearings provided a forum for national organizations to speak out on what
was seen as discriminatory and unjust practices.
Because of the outcry leading up to and during the hearings, and their
aftermath, Louisiana revised its state plan to change its eligibility
requirements.42 More importantly for the future of federal child welfare
policy, in January 1961, his final hours as Secretary before President
Kennedy's Administration took office, Secretary Flemming advised the
states that, effective June 30, 1961, federal funds under the ADC program
would not be allotted to states that terminated ADC assistance to children
in unsuitable homes unless the states provided out-of-home placement for
those children.43 If the states provided such placement as an alternative to
in-home ADC funding, the federal government would reimburse states for
40 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 35; see also Deborah Harris,
Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetortic, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619, 631 (1988) (noting that ADC allowed participating states to
consider a mother's "moral character").
41 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 35.
42 See id. at 62-63. See also GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 48-49 (1998) (noting
the 1960 enforcement of Louisana's ADC plan expunged 23,000 children, 95% of whom
were African American); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILD WELFARE PERSPECTIVES:
SERVING AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN 15 (Sondra Jackson & Sheryl Brissett-Chapman
eds., 1999) ("By 1961, the NAACP had accused [Louisiana] ... of expanding their
definition of home suitability requirements while unfairly and arbitrarily interpreting and
enforcing them to satisfy unjust and racist social, political, and economic purposes.").
43 See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 42, at 14-16.
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those costs under ADC grant allotments. 44 Alternatively, if the state made
a determination that a home was not suitable for a child, it could maintain
the ADC payment to the family and provide remedial services to make the
homes suitable for the child.45
These administratively declared policy changes were the genesis of
federal payments for foster care and for preventive services for children.46
The policy changes were implemented as requirements for federal
reimbursement to states. The federal government offered out-of-home
payments or preventive funds as open-ended grants to states under the
ADC program for ADC-eligible children.47 In the spring of 1961,
Congress passed legislation to codify the Flemming Rule as an amendment
to the Social Security Act with little debate.48 Again, for the future of child
welfare policy making, the new law was noteworthy not just for the
introduction of out-of-home and preventive funding, but also for the
requirements put in place before the funding could be triggered. Although
private philanthropic organizations and states had provided out-of-home
care to children since the Progressive Era,49 the federal government now
imposed oversight responsibility as a prerequisite to federal funds. Today,
we refer to this arrangement as a federally funded mandate.
Secretary Ribicoff announced the new legislation in the Social Security
Bulletin of July, 1961:
Under the new law the Federal Government will
participate in payments for foster-family care for a
dependent child under the following conditions: (1) He
would otherwise meet the existing definition of dependent
child except for his removal after April 30, 1961, from his
44 See HARRY F. BYRD, ADC BENEFITS TO CHILDREN OF UNEMPLOYED PARENTS, S. REP.
No. 87-165, at 6 (1961) (emphasis added).
45 See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 35, at 63.
46 See id. at 62-63.
41 See S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6.
48 Title IV of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 407-08, 75 Stat. 75, 75-78
(1961). The limited debate of the foster care provision that took place was focused on the
ability of the impacted states that still had suitability requirements to amend their
provisions. There was concern expressed that these states, some of whom had legislatures
that only convened biannually, needed an effective date of the amendments that gave them
adequate time to amend their laws and change their state plans to comply with the new
directives. See AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN OF UNEMPLOYED PARENTS, 107 CONG. REc.
3757-72 (1961); S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6.
49 See Ross, supra note 29.
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home by a court that has found that it is contrary to the
child's welfare to continue living there; (2) the assistance
agency is responsible for his placement and care; (3) he is
placed in a foster-family home as a result of the judicial
determination; and (4) he received aid to dependent
children in or for the month in which the court action was
initiated.5 °
Because there had been no central record-keeping for the number of
children who might now be eligible for these funds, the cost estimates were
small.5' The Conference Report on the bill estimated the new provisions
would cost only $3 million to $4 million.52
The Public Welfare Association explained why the cost impact was
estimated to be so low:
Most of the children who will now receive ADC while in
foster-care would have remained in their own homes as
ADC recipients, had this legislation not been passed.
Therefore, it is not expected to add substantial numbers of
children to the public assistance rolls. The additional
federal costs will probably range between three and four
million dollars for the 14-month period of operation. The
expenditures will be little, but the results will be extremely
rewarding, in terms of the new security and opportunity
provided to children threatened by unfortunate home
environments.53
The Association also emphasized the important policy implications of the
four-part eligibility requirement for the federal funds:
Though the foster-care legislation for ADC children is
limited, it is expected to stimulate and assist the states in
protecting and caring for children under proper
safeguards-that is, under the continuing watchfulness of
the public welfare agencies. Moreover, the new law will
s0 Div. OF PROGRAM STANDARDS AND DEv., BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, Notes and
Brief Reports: Amendments to the Public Assistance Provisions of the Social Security Act,
1961, 24 SOC. SECURrrY BULL. 18, 18-19 (1961).
51 See generally, Wilbur J. Cohen, Public Welfare Legislative Progress: 1961, 19 PUB.
WELFARE 91, 123 (1961) (discussing the minimal impact of legislation).
52 See H.R. REP. No. 87-307, at 1-3 (1961) (Conf. Rep.).
53 Cohen, supra note 51.
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further stimulate the use of professionally trained staff
who are skilled and experienced in the placement and
supervision of children outside their own homes.54
Today, the four-part eligibility criteria for federal foster care
reimbursement are still in place.5 Notably, given the end of the ADC
(later Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) over ten years
ago, the income eligibility criteria still refer back to the income eligibility
guidelines for public assistance before the program expired. Even years
after the public benefits program for which the income eligibility
requirements were written has ceased to exist, the federal government still
requires that the four criteria from 1961 be met, including the income
eligibility for public assistance.56
In 1962, Dr. Henry Kempe and his team of physicians published The
Battered Child Syndrome.57 Dr. Kempe became the face of the American
Medical Association (AMA) as it lobbied states to pass reporting
requirements to allow physicians to report child abuse.58 By 1967, every
state answered the AMA's call.59
All fifty states had some form of a reporting law in place, requiring
some professionals and other citizens to report suspected child abuse.
There was no uniformity among these laws and no central collection of
information on the scope of the problem of child abuse. In the early 1970s,
the U.S. Senate convened hearings on CAPTA, the first piece of federal
legislation on child abuse and neglect. 60 The Senate Subcommittee on
Children and Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, under
the leadership of Senator Walter Mondale, held hearings across the United
States, notably in Children's Hospitals, to gain support and determine the
54 id.
'5 See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1)-(3) (2006).56 See id.
57 C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 17
(1962). The article was reprinted with permission of the American Medical Association in
9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 143 (1985).
58 See BARBARA NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 13 (1984).
59 See id. ("Once alerted to the problem, the U.S. Children's Bureau and other
organizations drafted model child abuse reporting laws which were rapidly passed by all
state legislatures.").
60 See Child Abuse Prevention Act, 1973: Hearing on S. 1191 Before the Subcomm. on
Children and Youth of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 185-89 (1973)
[hereinafter Mondale Hearings].
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breadth of the act.6 1 In a letter of transmittal to the Senate Committee
Chairman, Mondale explained the need for the legislation:
The Subcommittee held hearings in Washington, New
York, Denver and Los Angeles. Members of the
Subcommittee personally visited victims of child abuse in
hospitals and observed firsthand the operations of multi-
disciplinary child abuse teams in several cities.
We were appalled to learn how many abused and
neglected children there are and how little is being done to
help them and their troubled families. Statistics vary
widely, but there is no question that thousands and
thousands of youngsters suffer severe physical and
emotional abuse every year. This is a problem that cuts
across social and economic barriers. It occurs in all kinds
of families and in all kinds of neighborhoods.
Yet there was no focused Federal effort to deal with the
problem. Nowhere in the Federal government could we
find one official assigned full time to the prevention,
identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect.62
CAPTA was the first piece of federal legislation to address child abuse
and neglect. 63 It required HEW to gather data from the states on child
abuse, a crucial component because so little was known at the time. 64 Most
important in terms of the subsequent history of the federal/state
relationship in addressing child abuse, CAPTA established a grant program
to provide federal funds to the states.65 Eligibility for federal grants
required states to follow a series of mandates.66 The mandates covered
reporting, investigating, confidentiality of record keeping, and law
61 See generally id. (containing almost 600 pages of witness testimony and statements
made at the Child Abuse Prevention Act hearings).
62 Letter from Walter Mondale to Harrison A. Williams (Mar. 15, 1974), in Child Abuse
and Prevention Treatment Act, 1974, P.L. 93-247 (S. 1191), Questions, Answers, Analysis
and Text of the Act, 93rd Congress, at vii-viii.
63 KASIA O'NEILL MURRAY & SARAH GESIRIECH, A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 3, available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/Legislative.
pdf.
64 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1976).
65 Id. § 5103.
66 See id. § 5106a(b)(2).
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enforcement cooperation.67 CAPTA established the structure within the
Social Security Act to provide federal funds to states for services to
address child abuse and neglect in exchange for state codification and
implementation of federal mandates.
68
By the end of the 1970s, the reporting system for child abuse and
neglect had exploded well beyond the predictions of the 1973 Mondale
hearings.69 Senator Cranston summarized the situation before the Senate in
1979:
The number of children in foster care in 1977 was
approximately 500,000-nearly three times the number of
children in foster care as compared to 1961 .... In only
one of every five cases does the services plan for these
foster children recommend a specific length of placement.
In other words, the so-called temporary provision of foster
care has no definite target date for ending the placement
and for placing the child in a permanent family setting.
Over half the children in foster care have been away from
their families for more than 2 years-about 100,000
children have spent more than 6 years of their lives in
foster care. Nearly one-fourth of the children have been in
three or more foster family homes. Even in cases where
the agency had developed a plan for returning the child to
his or her home, in one-third of the cases, there was no
plan for visits between the child and the parent or another
person who would care for the child if returned home.
There are more than 100,000 children in foster care
awaiting adoption.7°
The problems of "unnecessary placement" and "foster care drift,"
described by Senator Cranston, led to the passage of the AACWA and the
establishment of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, which covered
foster care and adoption assistance programs. 7' The AACWA mandated
that states provide a plan to the federal government requiring that in each
67 See id.
68 See id. §§ 5101-119c. Although all states had some form of reporting law in place
before CAPTA, few met the more rigorous CAPTA requirements before 1974. See
Mondale Hearings, supra note 60, at 1.
69 See 125 CONG. REc. 22,681 (1979).
70 id.
7" Pub. Law 96-272, 94 Stat. 501 § 101(a)(l).
[38:349
FUNDING FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
case, the child welfare agency would make "reasonable efforts" to prevent
placement or achieve reunification for children temporarily placed in foster
care.72 The law also established a new program of adoption assistance to
continue funding for children adopted out of the foster care system.73 In
addition to the reporting, investigating, and record keeping governed by
CAPTA, states then needed to follow federal mandates governing entry
into foster care and judicial oversight of placements.
The fiscal strategies employed to fund these new AACWA mandates
contradicted the policy changes. Although the law sought to limit
unnecessary placements by requiring a judicial finding of "reasonable
efforts to prevent placement," Title IV-E provided uncapped funds for
foster care and adoption assistance based upon a federal-state matching
formula.74 The eligible children that were placed in foster care were
eligible for the federal matching funds. The preventive services, or the
"reasonable efforts" emphasized in the new law, were in Title IV-B as
capped grants.7  Unlike placement services, preventive services would
only be reimbursed up to a certain predetermined level.76 Still, the
introduction of Title IV-B grants and the new emphasis on preventive
services initiated a reduction in the number of children entering foster care
in the 1980s.77
For a variety of reasons-the explosion of crack cocaine in inner cities,
economic downturns, overstretched preventive services-the number of
children in out-of-home placement climbed throughout the 1990s. 78 A
series of widely publicized, horrific deaths of children at the hands of their
parents while under the supervision of child welfare agencies led to an
outcry for reform of the system, again emphasizing the need for placement
over prevention in some cases.79
The next major piece of federal legislation, The Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), was the federal response to both the call for
swifter removal in cases with "aggravated circumstances" and for
72 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (1982).
" See id. § 672(a).
14 See id. § 674(a)(1)-(3).
"5 See id. § 623(a).76 See id. § 621.
77 See Children's Defense Fund, The State of America's Children Yearbook 22 (1994).
78 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foster Care, in 2 POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND POLICY 328 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice
O'Connor eds., 2004).
79 See, e.g., New York State Commission on Child Abuse, Final Report (1996).
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expedited adoptions when the hopes for reunification were slim.80 This
legislation amended provisions of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
but left in place the federal-state funding structure and income eligibility
requirements.8 '
In 1999, Congress again amended the Social Security Act to address
the unmet needs of older children, some of whom had aged out of the
foster care system, in the Foster Care Independence Act (FCIA). 2 In
2008, the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoption Act
of 2008 (FCSIA) was passed into law. 3 Like CAPTA, AACWA, and
ASFA, these two laws are also codified within parts IV-B and E of the
Social Security Act, maintaining the framework of federal-state fiscal
strategies.8 4 These provisions of the Social Security Act still provide
grants, as well as matching funds, various matching rates for different
categories of service, and antiquated eligibility requirements that result in
decision-making with an eye to reimbursement. Under current law,
services are still not reimbursed equally. States must continue to consider
the myriad of funding streams, accounting categories, and reimbursement
rates when designing their responses to child abuse and neglect.
The Supreme Court and subsequent Bush Administration policies have
emphasized the fiscal nature of the federal relationship to state and local
child welfare systems and limited the force of federal mandates. In Suter
v. Artist M,85 the Court clarified that a state merely had to have a plan
approved by the federal government to be eligible for federal
reimbursement for qualified services. 6 The case was a challenge to
Illinois practices as insufficient under the mandates of the AACWA.87 In
finding for the state, the Court made clear that actual implementation of the
mandates is not contemplated under the law.88 Instead, the law requires
that each state have a plan that applies to the entire state ("plan in
effect"). 89 The plan must detail how the state will meet the mandates
8o See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C)-(D) (2000).
8t See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115-36.
82 Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 1822 (1999).
13 Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008).
84Id.; 113 Stat. at 1822.
8" 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
86 Id. at 358.
87 See id. at 351-52.
'
8 See id. at 358.
89 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(3) (2006).
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contained in the federal law.90 Once the plan is approved, the state is
eligible for federal reimbursement. 9' The state practices are subject to
audits by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).92 HHS
may limit funding in some instances based on failures uncovered by the
audit, but the law does not create rights for the children or families served
by the system.93 Instead, the law provides for a fiscal contract between the
state and federal government. 94
In a 2005 HHS issue brief on Federal Foster Care Funding, the
exclusively fiscal dimension of the federal child welfare laws was
articulated forcefully:
It should be noted that while Title IV-E eligibility is often
discussed as if it represents an entitlement of a particular
child to particular benefits or services, it does not. Instead,
a child's Title IV-E eligibility entitles a State to Federal
reimbursement for a portion of the costs expended for that
child's care.95
III. STATE AND LOCAL FUNDING OF CHILD WELFARE
A. State Use of Federal Entitlement Programs
Two results of the current fiscal federalism for child welfare services
developed from 1961 to the present are: (1) high administrative costs; and
(2) lack of uniformity between states on what service is billed to what
category of service delivery. These make actual cost assessments difficult.
In the AACWA, Congress established Title IV-E of the Social Security Act
to establish new entitlement programs to serve the needs of abused and
neglected children and their families.96 Foster care and adoption assistance
are open-ended federal entitlements. 97 The current federal matching rates
for foster care and adoption assistance range from 50-75% of the total state
cost of foster care maintenance and adoption subsidies.98 States receive a
federal match, keyed to their Medicaid matching rate, for all eligible
90 See id. § 67 1(a).
9' Id. § 674(a).
92 See id. § 671(a)(13).
9' See id. § 674(d)(1).
94 See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356 (1992).
95 Radel, supra note 10, at 3.
96 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
97 See id.
98 See Radel, supra note 10, at 5.
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children receiving these entitlement services. 99 For administrative and data
collection services, states receive a 50% match.'00 Finally, for allowable
training of state and local workers, as well as for institution-based workers
who serve Title IV-E eligible children, the states receive a 75% federal
match.'0 ' The matching rate for foster care maintenance and adoption
assistance varies by state in accordance with the federal Medicaid formula,
but administration, data collection, and training are reimbursed at the same
matching rate for all states for allowable costs.
Overall, the federal contribution to foster care expenditures is
approximately one-half of the total cost of the services.'0 2 State and local
governments contribute the other half of the funding. 0 3  Most federal
funding comes from Title IV-E, covering both foster care maintenance and
adoption assistance.' °4 It is approximately half of all federal funding,
followed by TANF, SSBG, Medicaid, and finally Title IV-B. 105 Title IV-
B, providing preventive funds for child welfare, accounts for about only
5% of federal spending for child welfare. 1°6 Despite the policy initiatives
and mandates for family preservation and other non-placement services,
federal funds for non-placement services are very limited. 107 This is one
example where federal mandates seek reunification and family
preservation, but dollars allocated make this lofty goal difficult to achieve.
The different matching rates create tremendous administrative costs.
In fact, overall administrative costs exceed service delivery expenses.
10 8




102 CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILD WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006),
available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0317.pdf (fact sheets




106 Id.; Sankaran, supra note 19, at 300.
107 See Sankaran, supra note 19, at 300; KASIA O'NEILL MURRAY, THE CHILD WELFARE
FINANCING STRUCTURE 2, available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/Murray
Paper2.pdf.
108 Federal maintenance payments were $1.8 billion, while administrative expenses
accounted for $2.1 billion. CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE COST OF
PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V UNDERSTANDING STATE VARIATION IN CHILD
WELFARE FINANCING 15 (2006).
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this the category with one of the lowest reimbursement rates for states. 0 9
In 2004, administration and child placement services accounted for 49% of
foster care expenditures, while foster care maintenance payments
accounted for only 40%." ° This is a frustrating fact given the shortage of
resources to deliver services. There is a higher reimbursement rate for
service delivery in most states, but the administrative costs in properly
accounting for the necessary eligibility requirements are high."' Although
a large proportion of administrative expenses are due to case management,
considerable cost is also spent tracking the various requirements for full
federal reimbursement eligibility." 1
2
Because the federal matching rates are so high, states have a strong
incentive to maximize the allotted federal funds. States expend great
administrative costs in trying to verify eligibility for each child entering the
system, even though only approximately half of the children are ultimately
certified as eligible (as discussed in the next section).' The SFY 2006
funding report by Child Trends stated, "Based on the 44 states that
provided sufficient data for both years, Title IV-E foster care maintenance
payments decreased by 8% ($125 million) between SFY 2004 and SFY
2006, and other administrative and placement activities, training and
SACWIS [information systems] combined dollars increased by 4% ($86
million).,'14
The national story does not accurately illustrate the great variation
among states. For instance, in Alaska, maintenance payments account for
only 15% of foster care expenditures, while administration and child
placement services account for 60% of the federal funds into the state." 5
In the largest state, California, federal funding for administration is 60.6%
109 See Radel, supra note 10, at 2.
1l0 CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, supra note 102.
111 See, e.g., IOWA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., DETERMINING TITLE IV-E ELIGIBILITY 2
(2004) (listing reimbursement rates for foster care maintenance, monthly adoption
subsidies, and rates for training expenditures as being higher than administrative rates).
112 See DEVOOGHT, supra note 16, at 11-12 (explaining that both caseworker salaries
and eligibility determination are significant administrative expenses).
3 Id. at 24.
114 Id. at 11.
115 CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILD WELFARE IN ALASKA 2 (2006), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-repository
/cwf/child-welfare-financing-fact-sheet-alaska-2006.pdf [hereinafter CLASP REPORT:
ALASKA].
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while funding for maintenance is 30%. 1 16 In Georgia, the gap is not as
great and the majority goes to maintenance, with maintenance payments
accounting for 51.75% with administration only 47.12%.
117
Beyond the administrative expenses for eligibility determinations,
states also must accurately track which service goes with which funding
stream and with which matching rate. 1s Although category criteria are
narrow, each individual state makes different assessments on how to bill
these lines and is then audited on accuracy. 1 9 This process makes it
difficult to collect accurate data on service costs because some states
successfully place more of their costs in one category, while other states
may place those same costs in another category.
The variation in claiming practices made possible by the complexity of
the reimbursement rules makes assessment of foster care costs impossible.
Claims per eligible child for foster care maintenance costs range from a
federal match of $2829 to $20,539.120 This is not a reflection of merely
higher costs or grander services in some states over others, but instead
largely reflects differences in the narrowness or generality with which
states allot costs to foster care maintenance as opposed to administration,
training, or data collection. "Claims for child placement and
administration vary from 10 cents per dollar claimed of maintenance to
$4.34. Six states claim less than 50 cents in administration for every
maintenance dollar claimed, while nine states claim more than $2 in
administration for every dollar of maintenance.'
121
In 2005, HHS issued results of state compliance with federal
requirements-the HHS measure of quality-against the federal matching
116 CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILD WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2006), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-repository
/cwf/child-welfare-financing-fact-sheet-california-2006.pdf. See also U.S. CENSus
BUREAU, GCT-TI-R. POPULATION ESTIMATES (2007), available at http://factfinder.census.
gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo id=OOOOUS&-box headnbr=GCT-T1-R&-ds_
name=PEP_2008_EST&-format=-US-40S (providing statistics to show that California is the
largest state by population).
117 CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CHILD WELFARE IN GEORGIA 2 (2006), available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-repository
/cwf/child-welfare-financing-fact-sheet-georgia-2006.pdf.
.. See 42 U.S.C. § 674(a) (2006).
"9 See id. § 674(b)(4).
120 Radel, supra note 10, at 8.
121 Id. at 11.
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cost per child. 122 The results showed higher claims per child did not result
in higher quality service.
123
The three states with the highest claims per child were in
compliance with 3, 5 and 7 areas respectively of the 14
possible areas of compliance in their first Child and
Family Services Review (CFSR). Average per-child
claims did not differ appreciably between the highest and
lowest performing states .... There are States with
relatively high-and low-Federal claims at each level of
CFSR performance.124
To receive the federal match for eligible children, states must follow
the mandates in the laws for each of the programs discussed in Part II and
must provide the state portion of the match. Even though the federal
government pays about half of the cost of all of these programs for eligible
children, the restrictive eligibility requirements and the need for state
matching funds sometimes make the entitlement funding streams less
lucrative for states than capped grant or block grant programs. 25 When
states choose to use grant or block grant funds to pay for open-ended
entitlement services, they are trading away other necessary human services
that could also draw from the grant pool, but not the entitlement pool.
This growing dependence on general human services funding to
provide mandated child welfare services that can be provided with
dedicated funding is a growing trend in the child welfare fiscal federalism
story. From 2004 to 2006, federal expenditures under Title IV-B and IV-E
only increased 1% and 2%, respectively. 26 Federal expenditures for child
welfare activities over the same period increased 16% and 19% from
Social Security Block Grants and Medicaid, respectively.1
27
122 See id. at 13.
123 Id.
124 id.
125 See MARGY WALLER, BLOCK GRANTS: FLEXIBILITY VS. STABILITY IN SOCIAL
SERVICES 3 (Frederick Dews and Anjetta McQueen eds., 2005), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/es/research/projects/wrb/publications/pb/pb34.pdf, for a discussion on block
grants in social services.
126 DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 8.
127 id.
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B. Federal Grants for Non-Entitlement Services
Title IV-E is the largest source of federal funds for child welfare
services with the unlimited matches available for foster care maintenance
and adoption assistance subsidies. 28 Title IV-B is the other federal source
of funding exclusively available for child welfare services. 12 9 Title IV-B
provides capped aid to states in the form of grants for some child welfare
services. 130 It is a very attractive source of funds because it does not have
the eligibility requirements of Title IV-E and because the state match is
only 25%. 131 However, the funds are capped at low levels compared to the
unlimited funds available under Title IV-E. 132 Title IV-B accounted for
only 5% of child welfare spending in 2006, while Title IV-E accounted for
48%.133 Most prevention and family preservation funding is under Title
IV-B.
134
Although the federal law may substantively favor family preservation
and reunification in policy since the AACWA, the law has always fiscally
incentivized foster care and adoption placements. States can use limited
Title IV-B funds for a range of prevention and reunification services, but
the money runs out. The foster care maintenance and adoption assistance
funds, on the other hand, are an unlimited source of funds for states.
Again, this evidenced a dichotomy between federal policy agendas and
fiscal incentives.
This disparity in funding between prevention/reunification and
placement has only increased over time. Between 1989 and 2001, federal
funding under Title IV-B remained nearly stable and well below $1
billion. 3 ' During the same period, Title IV-E funds soared from nearly $1
billion to nearly $7 billion annually. 136 At the state level, the disparities are
dramatic. In 2004 and 2006, Alabama claimed a little over two-times the
128 See id. at 9.
129 See id. at 6.
130 See id. at 15; COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 106TH
CONG., 2000 GREENBOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 651 (Comm. Print 2000)
[hereinafter 2000 GREENBOOK].
131 See DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 tbl.1.; 2000 GREENBOOK, supra note 130,
at 647.
132 See DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
133 Id. at 8 fig.6.
14 See id. at 24; 2000 GREENBOOK, supra note 130.
135 2000 GREEN BOOK, supra note 130, at 648 tbl. 11-2.
136 Id.
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amount for Title IV-E as for Title IV-B. 13 7 In Alaska, Title IV-E payments
were nearly twenty times the amount claimed for Title IV-B."'
Comparing two heavily populated states, California claimed less than two
times as much for Title IV-E as for Title IV-B, 139 whereas New York
claimed fifteen times as much.1
4 0
C. State and Local Substitution of Social Security Block Grants,
Medicaid, and TANF Funds for Dedicated Child Welfare Services
Beyond the two dedicated sources of federal funds, Titles IV-B and E,
states also use other sources of federal money to cover some eligible costs
for children and families served by the child welfare system. In fact,
Social Security Block Grants and Medicaid are growing sources of
funding, outpacing even Title IV-E, the dedicated, open-ended funding
source for foster care. 141 Nearly all the growth in federal funding for foster
care between 2000 and 2002 was from growth in the use of Social Security
Block Grants, Medicaid, and TANF.142 Medicaid, an uncapped entitlement
program for eligible children, provided 10% of all child welfare funds in
2004.143 TANF replaced the AFDC Program in 1996.144 Emergency
Assistance was rolled into TANF. In 2004, it provided 19% of the funds
claimed by states for child welfare services. 145 From 2004 to 2006, the use
of these three sources of non-dedicated funding accounted for 44% of the
federal funds for child welfare services, an increase of 16%.146
Medicaid carries the same matching rate as foster care maintenance
payments and is similarly an open-ended entitlement program. 147  The
program is used for initial health screens as well as for routine medical
care for children in foster care. 148 All Title IV-E eligible children are




141 See id. at 8.
142 See ROSEANA BESS & CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA, CHILD WELFARE SPENDING
DURING A TIME OF FISCAL STRESS (2004), available at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/
411124_ChildWelfareSpending.pdf.
143 See DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 8.
'44Id. at 16.
145 Id. at 8 fig.6.
'46 See id. at 15.
147 See id. at 7 tbl. 1.
141 See id. at 18.
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eligible for Medicaid and most children in the foster care system, even if
not IV-E eligible, are eligible for Medicaid services.
149
States have wide discretion in their use of TANF funds, but the funds
are a blocked grant, capped for each state. 150 Nonetheless, they are an
attractive source of funding because they do not require a state match.' 5' If
these funds are used for child welfare services, they are not available for
other local needs. States use the funds to provide cash assistance to
families and for various employment services so that families can stay
together with adequate income to survive. 152 Because of the broad policy
goals of TANF, the funds can be used for a wide variety of services, such
as parenting classes that could be billed under Title IV-B. 53 However, the
limited funds available in Title IV-B may push states to categorize services
in the TANF category. Emergency Assistance was another source of
funding formerly used by states for child welfare services, but those funds
are now rolled into TANF funds.
154
D. State and Local Contributions to Child Welfare Funding
State and local contributions to child welfare funding exceed federal
contributions. 155 This means that even though federal funds are available
at a matching rate of at least 50% for all categories of services, the
eligibility requirements for some sources of federal funds and the caps on
many other types of federal funds force states to dip into state funds for
much of the overall cost of child welfare services. States, in turn, can push
the costs down onto the local governments. Overall, in fiscal year 2004,
the federal government covered 48.52% of the total cost of child welfare
spending, amounting to $11,662,213,004.156 States contributed 39.20%, a
total of $9,071,468,186.157 Local government covered 12.28% of the costs
for a total of $2,544,500,801.'58 These percentages remained largely
149 See id. at 7 tbl. 1.
150 See id.
151 Id.
152 See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ABOUT
TANF PROGRAM, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanf/about.html (last visited Jan. 17,
2009).
153 See DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 6-7 tbl. 1.
114 Id. at 16.
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unchanged in 2006, with the federal government contributing 47.9% ($12.4
billion), states contributing 41.0% ($10.7 billion), and local governments
contributing 11.1% ($2.6 billion).159
It can be difficult to understand child welfare funding just by looking
at the national ratios because the variation between federal, state, and local
funding percentages is so great among the states. Local funding is
becoming an increasingly important aspect of the child welfare system,
with sixteen states reporting that they required local governments to
provide matching funds to draw down federal funds.160 The largest state
system, California,' 6 ' along with Ohio and Minnesota, required more
matching funds from the local governments than from the state. 162 Ohio
and Minnesota remain the only states that require localities, and not the
state, to provide matching funds for federal child welfare funds.
163
In 2004, the Bush Administration attempted to change child welfare
funding by eliminating the various categories and matching rates, and
replacing them with the Child Welfare Program Option.164 Although the
saving of administrative time and expense by eliminating archaic eligibility
criteria and needless categorization of services to a given child is a
laudable goal, that program provided only capped funding, albeit flexibly,
to states. 65 Given the rise in Title IV-E costs, capping funds at current
levels with modest increases is a way to manage costs, but it is not
necessarily a way to provide quality services. The relationship of the funds
to model services or positive outcomes has yet to be explored. Ohio has
been piloting a flexible funding demonstration project to provide funds on
an experimental basis. Florida was also granted a waiver to use federal
funds flexibly, without the strict limits imposed by the various funding
159 DEVOOGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at 4 figs.3-4.
'60 See id. at 22.
161 Id. at 27 app.A.
162 Id. at 22.
163 See id. (noting that Ohio and Minnesota are the only states to require local
governments to match 100% of the funds from the federal government).
164 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF
THE TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS (2008), http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs_fund/cwwaiver/2008/summarydemo2008.htm (discussing
program details); see also RUTLEDGE Q. HUTSON, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, BUSH
ADMINISTRATON'S "CHILD WELFARE PROGRAM OPTION" PUTS CHILDREN WHO HAVE BEEN
ABUSED OR NEGLECTED AT GREATER RISK 2-4 (2007), http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/
publications/files/0343.pdf (discussing of the pros and cons of Bush's program).
165 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 164.
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streams. 166 Evaluation of these programs is pending. 167 Regardless of the
balance between federal, state, and local shares, what remains unknown is
how implementation of federal policies may vary depending on the fiscal
strategies employed by local governmental administrations. Part IV begins
to explore whether local fiscal policies for funding federal mandates
correlate with, and ultimately impact, outcomes for children.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF OHIO'S LOCAL FUNDING AND THE
IMPACT ON ADOPTIONS
The Public Children Services Association of Ohio (PCSAO) provided
aggregate level data from 1997 to 2007 related to their "Safe Children,
Stable Families and Supportive Communities" initiative that works to
improve the quality of care for children who are facing family
disruptions.1 68 Ohio is comprised of eighty-eight counties.1 69 Each county
166 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROFILES OF THE
CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: FLORIDA-FLEXIBLE FUNDING,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs fund/cwwaiver/2007/florida.htm.
167 See id.
168 PCSAO provided the data for this paper via electronic transfer to the authors. The
excel data files were transported in SPSS and linked into a unified longitudinal data file for
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to clean the data for accuracy. Frequencies
explored minimum and maximum values, and missing values were assigned. Independent
sample T-Tests assessed for differences between mean values of the variables of interest,
notably: 1) share of federal, state, and local funding for Title IV initiatives; 2) number of
children in state care; 3) number of adoptions finalized; and 4) the mean days to adoption.
Although only two counties for any analysis were outside two standard deviations from the
mean, we did not center the data as there was little possibility of data entry error due to
PCSAO's methodology. Only those counties that placed children for adoption were
included in the analysis comparing the number of days children await adoption. SAS was
used for data management and SPSS 16 for analysis.169 E.g., Counties by CPOE Size Category
Listed from smallest population to largest population
(Rev. 5/1/08)
Small Medium- Medium Large Metro Major
Small Metro
Vinton Guernsey Darke Miami Warren Hamilton
Noble Mercer Pickaway Ashtabula Trumbull Franklin
Monroe Ottawa Ashland Allen Lake Cuyahoga
Morgan Holmes Seneca Columbiana Mahoning 3
Harrison Madison Knox Wayne Lorain
(continued)
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has a public child service agency that provides data to the PCSAO
regarding children in care. 170 PCSAO publishes a biannual report that
tracks changes within two-year timeframes to assess the number of
children in custody, days awaiting placement, and detailed information on
how well Ohio is meeting its goals of helping children secure
permanency. 71  This data is published to monitor improvement.172 We
analyzed this data to compare the number of children in care, the number
of finalized adoptions, and the mean days children await adoption between
those counties with dedicated tax levies, and those without levies. The
Paulding Preble Huron Wood Butler
Wyandot Fulton Sandusky Richland Stark
Meigs Highland Washington Clark Lucas
Pike Clinton Lawrence Fairfield Montgomery
Adams Brown Athens Greene Summit
Fayette Crawford Marion Portage 10
Carroll Logan Belmont Licking
Van Wert Auglaize Jefferson Delaware
Henry Union Hancock Medina
Hocking Shelby Ross Clermont















Small: 39,999 and less
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES (July 1, 2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/CO-EST2007-0 1.html (chart provided by PCSAO).
170 See PCSAO, THE CHILD PROTECTION MISSION: SAFE CHILDREN, STABLE FAMILIES
AND STRONG COMMUNITIES, PCSAO FACTBOOK 16 (9th ed. 2009-10) [hereinafter PCSAO
9th ed.], available at http://www.pcsao.org/2009_2010PCSAOFactbook/MeasuringOur
PerformanceCFSR.pdf.
17l See id. at 23, available at http://www.pcsao.org/2009_201OPCSAOFactbook/Ohio.
pdf.
172 Id. at 16, available at http://www.pcsao.org/2009_2010PCSAOFactbook/Measuring
OurPerformanceCFSR.pdf.
20091
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
years for comparison were 1997 and 2007. Additionally, we depict the
ten-year period in-between to provide reference points for the analysis.
Approximately half of the counties have dedicated children services
tax levies. 173 Although these provide a defined, reliable source of income
for the term of the levy, they are subject to periodic approval by the voters
in the various counties. 174 With difficult economic trends in Ohio over the
last few years, it was unclear before analysis whether the levies would
result in stronger or weaker outcomes for children. The three largest
metropolitan areas in Ohio (Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati' 75) all
have levies, 176 and it was unclear whether these larger child welfare
systems would have better or weaker outcomes than their smaller
counterparts.
Ohio is noted as the state with the highest percentage of local
funding1 77 at 49% of the total child welfare public expenditures. 178 Federal
funds account for 43% and state funds account for only 8% of the total
costS. 179 For Title IV-E funds, the allocations are 57% federal, 25% state,
and 18% local. 180 The variation among the counties in the federal vs. state
vs. local funding breakdown for Title IV-E funding is great, with many of
the smaller counties using a much smaller percentage of local funds.'
81
This information is lost in the aggregate costs because the larger counties
account for such a large share of the total costs. For total child welfare
expenditures, five counties (Adams, Wayne, Butler, Champaign, and
Montgomery) spent over 60% in local funding.182  All of these were
17 Id. at 23, available at http://www.pcsao.org/2009_201OPCSAOFactbook/Ohio.pdf.
174 See ATHENS COUNTY CHILDREN'S SERVS., AGENCY LEVY, http://www.
athenschildrenservices.com/pages/agency-levy; FRANKLIN COUNTY CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
THE 2009 CHILDREN SERVICES LEVY, http://www.co.franklin.oh.us/childrenservices/
history.cfm, for examples of county efforts to support levy votes.
175 OHIO DEP'T. OF DEV., OHIO'S POPULATION 1, http://www.development.ohio.gov/
research/files/p0006.pdf.
176 See PCSAO, THE CHILD PROTECTION MISSION: SAFE CHILDREN, STABLE FAMILIES &
STRONG COMMUNITIES, PCSAO FACTBOOK 59, 73, 85 (8th ed. 2007-08) [hereinafter
PCSAO 8th ed.], available at http://www.pcsao.org/factbook2007_2008.htm (follow "88
County Profiles" hyperlink; then follow "Cuyahoga," "Franklin," or "Hamilton" hyperlink).
177 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 164.
178 PCSAO 9th ed., supra note 170, at 23.
179 Id.
18o Id.
'8' See, e.g., PCSAO 8th ed., supra note 176, at passim.
182 Id. at 25, 41, 45, 137, 193.
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counties that had a dedicated levy. 183  Of those five counties, two are
metro, one is large, and two are small counties.'84 Twenty-three counties
spent less than 20% local funding.' 85 Of these, four counties (Ashtabula,
Crawford, Muskingum, and Ross) have a dedicated levy and nineteen do
not. 186 Among those twenty-three counties, twelve are small, five are
medium-small, five are medium, and one is large.
187
Adoption Assistance funding comes from Title IV-E. 8 8  Statewide,
18% of title IV-E funds are local.'89 Among the counties, there is again
variation, with nine counties spending 0% local funding for IV-E
services. 190 None of those nine counties have a dedicated levy.' 9 ' Eight of
the counties are small and one is medium. 92 The mean percentage data in
Tables 1 and 2 below depict the mean percentages of each county with
equal weight, not accounting for the costs associated with each percentage
that varies greatly among the various sized counties. The percentage
variation is captured in the standard deviations, in parentheses next to each
percentage, to illustrate the range of funding distribution among the
counties with and without a levy.
Table 1 provides an overview of the findings. When including all
eighty-eight counties, those with levies do receive a lower mean
percentage of state dollars, 30% compared to 37% for those non-levied
counties. The forty-three levied counties have a larger local mean
183 See id.
184 Butler and Montgomery are metro, Wayne is large, and Adams and Champaign are
small. See Census, supra note 169 (categorizing Ohio's eighty-eight counties by population
size).
18' PCSAO 8th ed., supra note 176, atpassim.
186 See id. at 31, 57, 143, 165.
187 Ashtabula County is large. Seneca, Ross, Pickaway, Muskingim, and Lawrence are
medium. Shelby, Mercer, Crawford, Brown, and Auglaize are medium-small. Van Wert,
Jackson, Fayette, Carroll, Hardin, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Noble, Putnam, Vinton, and
Williams Counties are small. See Census, supra note 169 (categorizing Ohio's eighty-eight
counties by population size).
... See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2006).
189 PCSAO 9th ed., supra note 170, at 23.
190 See id. at 29, 43, 71, 77, 103, 129, 161, 139, 145, 161 (citing specifically to data
from the following counties: Ashland, Carroll, Fayette, Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Morgan,
Noble, and Putnam).
191 See id.
192 Carroll, Fayette, Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Morgan, Noble, and Putnam are small.
Ashland is medium. See Census, supra note 169 (categorizing Ohio's eighty-eight counties
by population size).
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percentage share than counties without levies, 13% as compared to 8% of
total child welfare.
Table 1. Examining the Differences Between Counties (n=88) With
and Without Levies 93










_____________Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.)
Title IV
2007
Fed % Match 55(6.58) 57(5.26)
State % Match 37(9.96) 30(7.61)











Statistically Significant at the .05, .01 **, .001"**
193 See id. (assembling data from all eighty-eight counties). T tests: Fed Math: 1.63;
State Match, -3.90; Local Match, 4.66; Children in Care 1997, 3.06; 2007, 2.84; Adoptions
Finalized 1997, 2.99; 2007, 3.54; Mean Days to Adoption 1997, .655; 2007, -1.02.
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Table 2 provides findings when the twelve metropolitan and major
metropolitan counties are removed. There are differences related to
funding distributions. The state mean percentage match for non-levied
counties is still 37%; however, the state mean percentage match to these
smaller levied counties is 29% and becomes statistically significant.
Likewise, although the local mean percentage contribution appears to be
similar, 13% compared to 8%, it becomes statistically significant as well.
Table 2. Examining the Differences Between Small, Medium-
Small, Medium, and Large Counties (n=76) With and Without
Levies""











Fed % Match 55(6.58) 57(6.11)
State % Match*** 37(9.96) 30(7.90)






94 See PCSAO 9th ed., supra note 170 (assembling data from select counties). T tests:
Fed Math: -1.59; State Match, 3.42; Local Match, -3.96; Children in Care 1997, -4.78;
2007, -3.68; Adoptions Finalized 1997, -5.61; 2007, -4.00; Mean Days to Adoption 1997,
.032; 2007, 1.04.
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Statistically Significant at the p value = .05*, .01 **, .001 ***
The mean number of children in care per year for counties with
dedicated tax levies is significantly higher than that for those without
levies, as we suspected given the distribution of larger counties with levies.
When including all eighty-eight counties, as seen in Table 1, counties with
levies decreased the mean number of children in care from 672 to 546 from
1997 to 2007, while the mean number of children in care in non-levied
counties increased from seventy-two to seventy-five in the same period.
Taking out the twelve largest counties, Figure 1 depicts the trend was
similar over a ten-year period with an overall decline for those levied
counties from 161 to 150, compared to seventy-two with an overall
increase to seventy-five for the non-levied counties.







1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Between 1997 and 2007, the number of children placed for adoption
remained constant for non-levied counties at three children, but increased
for the counties with a levy from thirty-one to thirty-five children per year
when the larger counties were included. Likewise, Table 2 provides data
without the larger counties and still documents the increase from six
children who were adopted on average for levied counties to ten children,
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comparing 1997 to 2007. Figure 2 provides an overview of the ten-year
period with the larger counties removed and depicts an overall increase in
the number of children placed for levied counties.






1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2007
Perhaps of all the analysis, that which is of most interest is the median
days to await adoption. Regardless of the size of the county, or levy status,
federal, state, and local policies all aim towards placing children into
adoption in an expedient manner. The analysis of both Tables reveals that
counties with a levy decreased the number of days that children waited for
an adoption by 140 days between 1997 and 2007, from 489 to 349. Non-
levied counties showed a difference of thirty-seven days, decreasing from
445 to 408. Even with the larger counties removed, the levied counties
still reduce the mean days a child awaits placement by 104 days. In the life
of a child, that means permanent placement is achieved months earlier for
those counties with levies. Figure 3 depicts the ten-year trend for levied
and non-levied counties with the larger counties removed. The overall
difference for levied counties was 104 days versus a 37 day difference for
non-levied counties.
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2007
This analysis is preliminary, but the positive outcomes for counties
with levies in comparison to non-levied counties suggest that the use of
dedicated tax levies should be studied further. It also suggests that funding
mechanisms may have an impact on the services delivered to children in
the child welfare system.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1961, the federal government has played a major role in the child
welfare system by enacting laws attempting to balance the rights and
responsibilities of the parent, child, and state. 195 Each of these laws has
contained mandates attempting to address the problem of child abuse and
neglect, directing states to redesign their child welfare systems to meet
these mandates. 196 The key aspects of these laws are not just the mandates,
but also the funds that flow to states to reimburse them for their child
welfare services. Complex, discrete categories of service that bear little
relationship to practice, and funding mechanisms that do not match policy
incentives are in all the major pieces of federal legislation.
195 See supra note 1.
196 See discussion supra Part II.
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States use a variety of strategies to maximize federal dollars into their
states, 197 but these bear no relation to the mandates attempting to force
quality service delivery. The funding strategies do not match the mandate
incentives. Although the federal government mandates prevention over
placement, 98 states spend little on prevention in relation to placement, and
placement costs continue to grow. 199 The federal government provides
dedicated funding sources for child welfare, but funds are increasingly
used from other sources, draining resources from other human services
needs, due to their more attractive matching rates.200  There is no
uniformity in terms of how states categorize the same service, each using a
different mix of funding streams. Costs vary between states for a given
type of service, not only because of the cost of the service, but also because
of the accounting between the various categories.2 0' Administration to
service ratios vary wildly.202  The fiscal slights-of-hand make national
trends deceiving and meaningful evaluations impossible.
There is no uniformity between the states in how they apportion the
costs between the federal, state, and local governments. If states with
similar apportionment are grouped together, the quality of service, based
upon HHS assessments, runs the spectrum from grossly out-of-compliance
to model compliance. Likewise, comparing counties within a state would
result in a similar spectrum of service delivery quality.
Because local funds are a major component of the child welfare
system, we analyzed data from Ohio to determine whether one funding
strategy-local dedicated tax levies-positively correlated with child
welfare outcomes. We found over a ten-year period that the number of
children in care, number of finalized adoptions, and mean number of days
spent awaiting adoption were all better for the counties with a levy than for
those without. This suggests the need for further study of local funding
mechanisms and their impact on the delivery of adoption and other child
welfare services.
The substantive and fiscal dimensions of federal child welfare policy
must be in sync to deliver quality services to children and families.
Especially in times of fiscal retrenchment, analyses of which fiscal policies
197 See discussion supra Part III.A.
198 See discussion supra Part III.B.
199 See discussion supra Part III.B.
200 See discussion supra Part III.A.
201 See discussion supra Part III.A.
202 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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at the federal, state, and local levels lead to the best outcomes are
important to provide quality, efficient services to children in need.
